A Reflection on the political process of defense acquisition

In other places , such as this discussion about acquisition reform, and Dr Paparone’s discussion of The Fallacy of Technical Rationality, we have seen commentary on the nature of the acquisition process. There is a strong case for it being political in nature. In any event, politics plays a large role in creating the process, setting priorities for programs, funding levels (directed and otherwise, achieving results, and requirements for accountability and performance. Here are a couple recent news releases offered in evidence; They aren’t unique, you can find these happening everyday.

Atlanta Journal-Constitution,  January 23, 2009 Funding Support For F-22 Raptor

U.S. Reps. Phil Gingrey, a Marietta Republican, and David Scott, an Atlanta Democrat, and 186 other members of the U.S. House of Representatives wrote President Barack Obama this week urging continued funding for the F-22 Raptor built partly in Cobb County. The new administration, beset by budgetary deficits and shifting military priorities, is considering canceling production of the supersonic planes that cost between $137 million and $300 million. The U.S. Air Force originally intended to buy more than 800 F-22s built by Lockheed Martin. The total, though, has been whittled to 183.

Washington Post January 23, 2009 Pg. 8 Vets From Alaskan Force Lose Pay

ANCHORAGE — The Army has decided to cut off retirement pay for veterans of a largely Alaska Native militia formed to guard the then-territory from Japan during World War II. Officials said a nearly decade-old law under which they received the pay was misinterpreted and applied only to military benefits. Twenty-six surviving members of the Alaska Territorial Guard, most in their 80s and long retired, will lose as much as $557 in monthly pay starting next month.

Is there something inherently wrong with politics being so dominant?

Do you think you could actually design a scientific system that would “properly” identify the right programs and how to manufacture them?

Is there something inherently wrong with FCS being built in 238 congressional districts?

Is it an outrage that decisionmakers who are elected to represent the needs, concerns and positions of their constituents take into consideration like jobs and the expenditure of tax monies?

Who’s money do you think we are spending to build FCS?

Would you really advocate that all FCS components and end items be built in a single county somewhere? Really? Does that make sense from a security perspective? Like, right outside New Orleans?

Do you think we could do a better job of rationally designing the equivalent of a 5 year Plan for FCS development? I hear there are a lot of economists from the former Soviet Union available to help us do that.

A political process, designed to accommodate and balance the competing issues, needs, concerns and resources of multiple constituencies turns out to be a pretty robust way to make incremental decisions in a complex adaptive system (many variables, lots of uncertainty).

You ought to make arguments about whether or not the system has feedback loops and cycle times that are responsive enough to adapt to a dynamic world where the rate of change is increasing.

You are encouraged to consider answers that the current system is responding by adding Battle Labs, COTS, Operational Needs Statements, programs like REF and RFI, and then inquire into whether this is enough change and responsive enough to meet the challenges.

If it were, then why does it take a direct action from the SECDEF to yank us more quickly into MRAP acquisition? Or was that misguided?

These are not simple questions, but the questions look easy compared to coming up with a framework for answering them.

None of the answers are simple, because we are having a healthy and necessary debate about the very nature of the problem and how best to manage it.

If defense acquisition is truly a complex adaptive system, the argument would be that there isn’t a “correct solution” on how to reform the system that we could install and then expect to have “fixed” it.

Complex adaptive systems need ongoing attention and appreciation and adaptation to the new twists which are coming and which are unpredictable in terms of timing, complexity and implications.

Mindfulness, informed action, humble conclusions and constant attention turn out to be the kinds of qualities that must inform managerial judgment and programmatic action, along with the realization that there is no such thing as the right answer, just our best idea about what to do next based on current conditions and our professional insights, with a date time group, and our promise to keep paying attention.

PS: an interesting piece (to me anyway) of the Alaskan Vet story is that these guys are the Eskimo Scouts. In the early 90s, when we were recalibrating our strategic requirements after the fall of the Berlin Wall, DA G3 Plans decided that the over- the- pole threat from the former Soviet Union was no longer significant enough to justify the continuation of the Eskimo Scouts in the force structure.

As part of the TAA process in one of those years the recommendation was staffed and approved by the Army to eliminate these units. At the time we were trying to find ways to move slots into infantry units so that we could fill critical shortages in infantry platoons that were likely to become engaged in soldier-intensive operations like stability. Until, that is, word of this reached the ears of the chairman of the Senate Armed Services committee, a guy named Sen Ted Stevens. In less than 24 hours, after what were surely some heated conversations, the requirement to maintain and actually increase the number of Eskimo Scouts quickly found its way back into the strategic requirements list.

And so, the Scouts are still on the payroll. Until now, perhaps. Think this wont get some play? How interesting that this hot potato emerges now and not, say, last week. A cynic might say this is test case. Even if not intended as such, it could easily become one, and exactly no one knows how much traction it will have in the press, with larger fish to fry. But even tiny issues can develop into powerful symbolic issues as we have seen countless times.

I find it interesting that this issue coincides with Mr Stevens being frog-marched from the Senate, and that the government is quickly going after $557/month from 26 veterans in their 80s.

So, we are talking about a policy decision that represents something like $7,000 a year for 26 guys in their 80s. Do a quick mental estimate of the cost in manhours of the staffing that went into producing the staff recommendation.

Now, I will ask you to consider the thousands of routine, trivial but not inconsequential policy opportunities, floating around the Pentagon at any given moment and ask you to think about designing a “scientific, rational” system of adjudicating these policies when they arise, and planning for them throughout the lifecycle of programs.

Then I’ll ask you to compare your design against the emerging, adapting, fairly responsive political process that currently is in place.

It’s not pretty, but then that wasn’t what the Founding fathers had in mind when they were trying to design a robust, political system that accommodated the needs of the minority as well as the needs of the majority.

Robust systems that are adaptive and responsive to complex environments are rarely pretty, and never optimized. They just seem to keep going somehow.

In the same way that we want an informed, free press to be constantly shining the light on the inner workings of government, we might need a free thinking, critically thinking, imaginative professional officer and NCO Corps constantly looking with professional, skeptical, informed eyes at our processes of force generation and modernization.

I argue that it’s too important to leave just to professional technicians. It requires constant vigilance by educated professionals who care.

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